MOZAMBIQUE AND THE DEATH OF MACHEL

MOZAMBIQUE AND THE DEATH OF MACHEL

By Barry Munslow

Death of a president President Samora Machel  had been attending a summit meeting in northern Zambia with the heads of state of Angola, Zaire and Zambia itself. The summit was occurring amidst growing tension within southern Africa, and South Africa's war of destabilisation against Mozambique was seriously escalating. President Machel wanted to return to Maputo immediately after the summit on Sunday, 19 October 1986, because he had an important meeting on the following day. This meeting was to bring together all the senior officers in the armed forces and top party officials to discuss the much needed reorganisation of the country's military apparatus. This was deemed to be essential in order to combat the South African- backed  forces of RENAMO (the Mozambique National Resistance Movement) which were wreaking such havoc within Mozambique. What Machel had in mind for that meeting will never be known, as the Tupolev 134-A jet in which he was flying crashed at Mbuzini, in a remote corner of South Africa near the Mozambique and Swaziland border, killing the president. Immediately, controversy surrounded the circumstances of the crash. The official communique  released  by the Mozambican government declared that the plane had 'crashed, under circumstances not yet clarified'.' The South African Government meanwhile immediately blamed the Soviet crew for pilot error. Soon, as details of the crash began to leak out, there were strong suspicions that the presidential plane was lured off course by a decoy beacon, deliberately set up to divert the plane from landing at Maputo airport. A South African board of inquiry was set up to investigate the crash against the wishes and without the cooperation of the Mozambican Government. It released its final report on 9 July 1987, blaming the dead Soviet crew for pilot error and negligence. The international commission of inquiry, composed of representatives from South Africa, Mozambique and the Soviet Union, had presented a factual report on the crash earlier in January 1987, indicating that the plane had made a Right turn off its established route because of a radio signal received from a navigational beam. Mozambique's own national commission of inquiry rejected the South African Government's finding sand indicated that it would like the tripartite commission to investigate the mysterious radio beacon in further detail. In a radio broadcast made on 16 June 1987, Machel's successor, Joaquim Chissano, described his death as 'murder' for the first time and there were strong implications that the South African Government was involved. Once again the issue of succession to the leadership of FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) was to occur in a context of tragedy and possible assassination. On 3 February 1969, FRELIMO'S first president, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, was killed when he opened a parcel bomb in his Dar Es Salaam home. The deed was the work of the Portuguese secret service PIDE (International Police for the Defence of the State) in collaboration with people inside the movement. The assassination occurred at a most difficult time in FRELIMO's history. The movement formed in 1962 had taken up arms against Portuguese colonial rule in September 1964. The early years were marked by rivalries and defections within the movement's Central Committee but Mondlane was able to steer the movement to growing success. By 1968, when FRELIMO held its second congress, liberated areas existed in two of the country's nine provinces and the guerrilla struggle was opening in a third province. But ideological conflicts were coming to the fore as the issue of the nature of post-independence Mozambican society began to be raised in microcosm in debates concerning the organisation of the liberated areas and of the movement itself. Following the death of Mondlane, the Vice-President, Uria T. Simango, who represented the right wing within the movement, was keen to assume the mantle of the presidency. He quickly arranged a meeting of the executive committee and was able to harness sufficient support to be declared interim president. But there was major opposition to this move, led by the radicals, principally within the army. At the time of the assassination Machel and other leading radicals were inside the liberated areas and hence unable to deal directly with Simango's  manoeuvres. At a meeting of the Central Committee held in April 1969 Simango was prevented from replacing Mondlane, and instead a presidential council was formed, representing a triumviratele a dership of Simango, Machel (head of the army) and Marcelino dos Santos (the leading revolutionary intellectual within the movement). The radicals argued the case that succession was not automatic and this finally won 24 the day. Simango, who was opposed to the increasing radicalisation of the movement, was isolated and the left effectively took power.  In May 1970 at the following meeting of the Central Committee, Machel was declared President and Simango was expelled from the movement. The top leadership of the party from that time onwards has continued in power, showing remarkable stability and cohesion. An orderly succession The historical precedent did not appear to bode well for an orderly presidential succession, yet such it was to be. There were a number of possible candidates whose names were mentioned in the international press. Marcelino dos Santos was the vice-president of the party until the post was abolished at the third congress of FRELIMO held in 1977, but he did not harbour leadership ambitions. As a mix to (a person of mixed race) with a white wife there would be obvious political sensitivities of race to consider if such an issue arose, not with standing FRELIMO'S overt policy of anti-racism. (The Political Bureau has people of all the races represented in Mozambique.) While he remained listed second to Machel in the hierarchy of the Political Bureau the consensus of opinion was that he would not be the successor. The thinking behind the abolition of the vice-presidency was deliberately to prevent a clear hierarchy of succession being presented to the outside world. It was obvious to the astute observer of the FRELIMO leadership that Joaquim Chissano, listed third in the hierarchy, was the natural choice. His pedigree made him well suited to the task. As a youth he had been an active member of the student movement NESAM (Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students). He went on to study in Europe but soon joined the nationalist movement where he became the secretary to President Mondlane. Chissano also worked alongside Machel in FRELIMO's training camp at Kongwa in Tanzania and built up a close relationship with him there. He took charge of security and was later made chief representative in Tanzania. Following the signing of the Lusaka Accords between Portugal and Mozambique in September 1974, a transitional government was formed comprising six FRELIMO ministers and three appointed by the Portuguese, with Joaquim Chissano as Prime Minister. He was very popular in this role during the nine months of the transitional government and his appointment as successor to Machel was widely welcomed. Two other names mentioned as possible successors were Mario Machungo, the newly appointed Prime Minister in the post created following a major reorganisation of the structure of government earlier in the year, and Armando Guebuza, who has held a number of important positions in a rather varied career. Machungo, however, did not have the kudos of being involved directly in the armed liberation struggle. He was a highly qualified economist who before independence had worked in a bank in the capital city, being a clandestine member of FRELIMO. He only joined the political leadership at independence. He has held a series of senior economic positions in government including Minister of Industry (1975-78), Minister of Agriculture (1978-81) and Minister of Planning (from 1980). While Machungo has his base mainly within the state bureaucracy, Guebuza has tended to work within the party and security apparatuses. More recently, following the death, also in the plane crash, of the Transport Minister, Luis Alcantara Santos, Armando Guebuza has taken on that portfolio. While these names were being bandied about in outside circles, in reality there was no major struggle for power inside the Political Bureau. The overriding sentiment was one of shock and grief at the loss of Samora Machel and an urgent sense of the critical situation caused by the war within the country and increased regional tensions. Following the President's death, Joaquim Chissano called a meeting of the diplomatic corps accredited in Maputo to announce that the Political Bureau, in the name of the Central Committee, was directing all aspects of the nation's life. When the Political Bureau first met, however, they discussed only the arrangements for the funeral. It was not until after the funeral that there was a meeting to discuss the succession. In that meeting one of the members of the Political Bureau nominated Chissano, the case was made for him and all who were present assented. No other candidate was proposed. According to Article 57 of the post-independence Constitution, in the event of the death of the president, his functions are immediately assumed collectively by the Central Committee. As this is now a large body of people spread over the entire country with poor avenues of communication, this is impractical on a day-to-day basis and power is effectively in the hands of the Political Bureau. When the Central Committee meeting was finally convened, the recommendation of the Political Bureau was presented and in a matter of fifteen minutes it was accepted without dissent. This does not imply that the Central Committee is merely a rubber-stamping body. It has a number of very forthright members. At the fourth congress although forty-five of the fifty-four members of the old central committee were re-elected, a further eighty three new members were added, 'largely from rural areas and including many critics, who will totally outweigh the old guard'. On 3 November following this decision by the Central Committee, the forty seven-year-old Chissano became President of FRELIMO and, under the terms of Article 53 of the Constitution, also President of the People's Republic of Mozambique and Chief of the Armed Forces. In a formal sense there was no prior established line of succession. This precedent was established during the leadership crisis of 1969 and the point was underlined when the vice-presidency was abolished. In theory the new President did not even have to be a member of the Political Bureau, but such an occurrence would in practice be unlikely. That the succession was peaceful and orderly and did not provoke a major power struggle with recriminations and expulsions does not mean that the death of President Machel did not come as a severe blow to the party, the government and the population at large. Samora Machel was such a powerful personality and forceful figurehead that he was literally seen as being FRELIMO-its core and personification. Given the gap that his death left, the leadership was left considering how he could be replaced. It was clearly impossible to replace him with someone possessing a similar style: Samora's style was unique. As a style of leadership it was very direct but also informal, and contrasts markedly with that of his successor. First as the FRELIMO representative in Tanzania during the liberation struggle and later as Foreign Minister, Chissano's training as a diplomat has encouraged a more formal and less direct and personally expansive style. He plays his cards close to his chest and appears keen to encourage a devolution of power and responsibility. As a member of FRELIMO from its foundation in 1962 and of the Central Committee since 1963, he has digested the shared experiences and lessons learnt by the party, appearing committed to the method of collective leadership operating in the Political Bureau. While the style of leadership has undoubtedly changed with the succession the policy course had not shifted dramatically. During his maiden presidential speech, Chissano stressed the continuity of domestic policies and of a foreign policy based on the principles of African unity, non-alignment and socialism. That such a continuity has occurred and that the succession was accomplished so smoothly under tragic and menacing circumstances reflects the unity that exists at the top. This in its turn is a function of the nature of the collective leadership that has developed within FRELIMO. Hanlon suggests that this unity derives from three factors: a strong commitment to consensus; a tendency to institutionalise conflicts and keep them within the party and ministries; and, finally, the careful use of cadres and a commitment to give them another chance should they fail in one particular position. This does not mean that there is never conflict, only that it is contained. In an important new study of Mozambique, Bertil Egero identifies two major lines of divergence in the thinking that has shaped post-independence development. On the one hand, there is the modernisation ideology promoting heavy industry, central planning and state farms, reinforced by trends of thought stemming from both the socialist bloc and the state functionaries who had witnessed the rapid urban growth of the late colonial period. On the other hand, there is the ideology of the liberation war, of mass participation and decentralisation. As Egero observes, 'The blending of the modernisation imperative with the persistent line of mass participation lends a never resolved ambiguity to the overall development strategy'. This is reflected in the various twists and turns of policy over the years. But, whatever the outcome of the debates over strategy, one thing remains perfectly clear-without an end to the war very little development of any kind can take place. War and succession The worsening war situation in 1986 provided a difficult backdrop to the change of leadership in Mozambique. A counter-offensive by RENAMO in the early months of the year had brought considerable success. Initially the major thrust of the offensive was in Maputo province in the south with railways, roads and power lines subjected to crippling attacks. In February, RENAMO recaptured its main base at Gorongosa in the centre of the country. This had been taken the previous year in a combined  assault by Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops. As an act of solidarity amongst the Front line States both Zimbabwe and Tanzania had sent troops to Mozambique to aid the fight against the rebels. Mozambican troops left to guard the captured base were easily overrun. Morale was low and supplies inadequate, and this reflected more generally the state of the Mozambican army which was poorly trained and organised, with chaotic logistics. Press speculation at the time that peace talks with RENAMO were the only alternative'1 were quickly rejected by Mozambique. However, it is apparent that the Zimbabwean army was critical of its Mozambican counterparts. Some reports indicated that 5,000 of the 12,000 Zimbabwean troops defending the Beira corridor, which carries Zimbabwe's imports and exports to the sea, had been withdrawn following the loss of the base. However, given the natural turnover of troops and the changing circumstances of the war, fluctuations in the number of troops stationed at any one time in the country are inevitable. But a further grievance amongst some of the Zimbabwean commanders was that certain senior Mozambican army personnel were not extending their fullest cooperation to the Zimbabwean forces. It was plain to see, therefore, that the FRELIMO leadership had to institute a major reorganisation of  its war effort. Inside the country complaints about the army were made public at the Second Conference of Mozambican Youth held in March. Zacarias Kupela, the movement's secretary, spoke of corruption in the army with officers siphoning off supplies to sell on the black market. The reorganisation of the army was a major challenge confronting Machel but it was left to his successor to complete this task. However, important initiatives were taken. Special commando units were being trained for the first time and a special training programme for Mozambican soldiers was set up in Zimbabwe with the collaboration of the British Army. Since the signing of the Nkomati Accord non-aggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa in March 1984, South Africa has consistently violated the terms of the agreement. This was dramatically revealed when the diaries of the RENAMO leader were captured following the taking of his headquarters in Gorongosa. The diaries showed continuing South African support. Even Chester Crocker, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated publicly that RENAMO still existed. Support continued to flow to RENAMO, but Malawi now became the most important conduit. Little effective pressure had been applied on the Malawian government by the Frontline States and RENAMO appeared to operate across Malawi's borders with impunity. This was in spite of the fact that on his first official visit to Malawi in October 1984 President Machel had signed a non-aggression and cooperation pact. The central provinces of Mozambique - Zambezia and Tete in particular - were the worst affected by RENAMO activity. Mozambique's Natural Disasters Office warned in April 1986 that more than a million people faced starvation in Zambezia as a result of the war: 'Though rains have been plentiful, people are always moving from one place to another to seek relative stability. Therefore they have not been able to plant crops. In August 1986 the first signs appeared that tougher action was to be taken against the Malawian government. Mozambican troops crossed into Malawi in pursuit of rebels and fought a battle with Malawian troops near the town of Chikwana. In September Machel, Kaunda and Mugabe flew to Blantyre in a concerted effort to obtain cooperation in the war against the rebels. On Machel's return from the meeting he declared 'The Malawian police, the Malawian armed forces and Malawian security are all totally under South Africa's command."He threatened to close the border with Malawi and site missiles along the border if Malawian support to RENAMO did not cease. The Frontline States of Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania threatened to close their borders, which to land-locked Malawi could have disastrous consequences for the economy. With insufficient rain and the intensification of the war, by September 1986 the population of the three provinces bordering  Malawi  were in a perilous state. The Mozambican Government called for international assistance to avert a famine threatening to affect almost four million people.The pressure on Malawi began to have some effect and at the end of September it was agreed to create a high-level joint security commission between the two countries, a proposal first suggested by Machel a year and a half earlier. Malawi expelled a large number of RENAMO troops who had flooded across the border causing a major escalation of the fighting. One estimate suggested that 10,000 RENAMO personnel were involved. Their strategy was to try to cut the country in two by occupying the Zambezi valley, and a number of important towns were taken. Meanwhile, relations between South Africa and Mozambique deteriorated still further. Following a land-mine blast near the Mozambique border which injured six South African soldiers, Pretoria ordered an end to the recruitment of migrant labour from Mozambique. General M A Malan, the South African Defence Minister, warned that 'the Nkomati Agreement and land-mines cannot exist side by side'. As tensions mounted, Mozambique announced that it expected an invasion aimed at overthrowing the government. Less than seventy-two hours before the fateful plane crash, Carlos Cardoso, the director of the Mozambican information agency commented prophetically, 'Observers in Maputo believe that the assassination of the Mozambican leader appears to be in the minds of the South African generals, and there are already certain public indications of this. The thinking amongst the Political Bureau of FRELIMO is that the assassination of Machel might have been envisaged by the South African government in order to impede new developments taking place in three key areas. First, Samora Machel had played a very forceful role within SADCC and in the Frontline States. He had exerted a powerful influence for regional coordination to lessen links of dependency on South Africa. The death of Machel was one way of reducing Mozambique's influence within the region as it would take a new leader a while to acquire the same stature. Secondly, there were new developments taking place on the military front which Machel's death would almost certainly impede. There were two aspects to these developments. The first was the policy of increasing regional self-reliance militarily, notably cooperation with Zimbabwe, Tanzania and most recently Malawi. Military cooperation with the ruling ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe stretched back to the days of the liberation struggles, with guerrillas from the two parties fighting side by side as early as 1970 and FRELIMO's expanding area of activities permitting access to the north-east of Zimbabwe for ZANU forces. FRELIMO'S support for the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle massively increased following Mozambican independence, but the cost this entailed was enormous. In 1976, Ken Flower of the intelligence arm of the white settler government in Rhodesia set up the RENAMO force to try to undermine the Mozambican rear base of the Zimbabwean nationalists. He bred a monster that would later bring the Mozambican economy to its knees and destroy the social and material fabric of life for the overwhelmingly rural peasant population. Following Zimbabwe's independence and nearing the end of his life, Ken Flower was to destroy the claim made by some US Republican Senators and right-wing voices in Europe that RENAMO was a legitimate political force which deserved backing, when he commented, 'It is not a bona fide guerrilla movement because they have not got a clear political objective. I'll take it further than that, they probably couldn't have continued to exist without our [Rhodesian] assistance, they probably couldn't continue now without somebody else's assistance. We helped, we trained-inside Rhodesia-and those inside Mozambique provided the recruits. Their motivation was money. The debt that the newly independent government of Zimbabwe owed to Mozambique coupled with the importance of the Mozambican port and transport links to the sea for the Zimbabwean economy, laid a firm foundation for Zimbabwe's support for the FRELIMO government in its war against the rebels, whose paymaster at Zimbabwe's independence had been transferred to South Africa. From October 1982 Zimbabwean troops were brought into Mozambique to guard the Beira corridor, which provided a rail, road and oil-pipeline link between Zimbabwe and the port of Beira. From initially assuming a defensive role, the Zimbabwean Army was soon to adopt a more offensive strategy in collaboration with the Mozambican FPLM (Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique). Tanzanian troops were also brought in as part of the policy of regional military self-reliance. An interesting new development in 1987 is the bringing in of Malawian troops to help guard the northern Nacala railway line, a result of the pressure applied to the Malawian government by the Frontline states. A second aspect of the military arena that the killing of Samora Machel may have been aimed at impeding was the internal reorganisation of the Mozambican armed forces. Attempts to restructure and rectify problems in the armed forces were not a new phenomenon. Abuses of the population by the security forces had been a central target of the general offensive launched by FRELIMO in 1980 order to transform the state apparatus. As RENAMO infiltration and terrorism increased, the insufficiencies of the army to meet the challenge that they faced became more apparent. In August 1986, the Defence Minister, Alberto Chipande, presented a report on the armed forces to the National Assembly. In it he acknowledged the serious bottlenecks and problems of management and control that existed: 'We are aware of problems in supplying the troops, and in our recruitment and mobilisation. The problems in the army began at the top in terms of the chain of command and the division of labour. The processo for reorganizing the military was certainly slowed down by the death of Machel. President Chissano had not been in close contact with military affairs for a long time and he needed time to acquaint himself in detail with the situation. On 20 June 1987, however, in less than a year of Chissano assuming the presidency, a major reorganisation of the senior military staff was carried out. A new chief of general staff was appointed, as were new commanders for the three wings of the armed forces, and a reshuffle of the general directors in the Ministry of Defence and extensive changes in the military command in nine out of the country's ten provinces were effected. The changes were intended not only to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the army but also to smooth out any difficulties in the close relationship with the Zimbabwean forces noted earlier. The training  programmes and the use of elite commando forces were also having a positive effect on an improved war effort. A third possible aim of a South African strategy to eliminate Machel, according to the FRELIMO leadership, was to disrupt the newly reorganized governmental structure inside Mozambique. In March 1986 efforts were made to reassert party control over the state, with three Political Bureau members each being given a group of ministries to oversee. Then in July 1986 Mozambique's first Prime Minister was appointed and for the first time there began to be regular cabinet meetings, whereas previously much had been done on a bilateral basis between the President and each Minister. A communique at the time stressed that the number of tasks assumed by the President had to be reduced: 'The development of our political, military, economic and social situation is no longer compatible [with the concentration of responsibilities at the top] if we want to ensure efficiency in government'.The Prime Minister would now assume the role of heading the Council of Ministers and dealing with provincial governors. The communique went on to stress that the President would then be free to concentrate his efforts on the conduct of the war. The process of lightening the load on the President's shoulders and devolving responsibilities was carried further by Chissano, who also shed the task of running the National Assembly, a responsibility which took a considerable amount of Machel's time. The main strategic aim of the South African Government is to continue the war to such an extent that FRELIMO obliged to accept a coalition with RENAMO. They realise that at this period in Mozambique's history it would not be possible to do away with FRELIMO entirely, although some may think they can. On the other hand, they know they cannot achieve their aims with a FRELIMO government, hence the idea of a coalition. The situation in Mozambique by 1987 was drastic in the extreme, with one in three of the population facing starvation, half a million refugees displaced in neigh bouring states and 10 per cent of the population homeless. Half the schools in the country and a quarter of the health posts and health centres have been either closed or destroyed. Food aid needs for 1987-88 run to 650,000 tons of cereals. It is hard to see how a country as poor as Mozambique can continue to carry the cost of living on the front line with apartheid, but the government and people continue to shoulder the burden. A massive and continuing effort of international aid will be required, but also an increase in the pressure on South Africa through the use of sanctions. The key to peace within Mozambique and more generally within the region lies in change within South Africa. There are some bright spots on the horizon, however. Mozambique has been very successful in renegotiating its international debts, which had grown alarmingly with the country's economic decline. By the end of 1986 the outstanding disbursed foreign debt was US$3,400,000,000 and the debt service burden had risen to 275 per cent of its exports of goods and services. In June 1987 it won aid pledges of US$400 million from the Paris Club and the following month US$700 million at a meeting with donor nations at the World Bank; these were to cover its external financing needs. Debts to the socialist countries, estimated at US$478 million, were also to be renegotiated.A comp rehensive economic recovery programme was launched at the beginning of 1987 involving currency devaluation, higher producer prices, a new wages policy to improve productivity, changes in taxation policy and a drive to achieve greater efficiency and economy. The major development effort in the country centres on the Beira corridor. The port of Beira is being extensively modernised, with four berths being rebuilt and a number of other improvements which should be completed by the end of 1990. Upon the success of this project much depends, for many of the SADCC countries are alarmingly dependent upon South Africa for the transit of their goods. Conclusion If the FRELIMO leadership is correct in its assessment that the death of Machel may have been carried out with the connivance of the South African Government as part of a plan to force a coalition with RENAMO or, in the minds of some within the all-powerful State Security Council which effectively rules South Africa, to overthrow FRELIMO completely, then how successful have they been? Let us begin by examining the degree of success in the three instrumental goals of weakening Mozambique's influence within the region, causing a setback to new military developments both regionally and internally and disrupting the newly reorganised governmental structure. The response to the death of  Machel by other countries within the region was to rally around with support to Mozambique. Regional policies within SADCC have already been agreed, with a strong input from Mozambique, which has the all-important transport portfolio. The new Transport Minister, who also bears responsibility for SADCC work, is now a Political Bureau member, Armando Guebuza. FRELIMO'S impact on SADCC is likely to remain considerable, therefore, and will remain strongly anti-apartheid. President Chissano, as former Foreign Minister  has excellent regional and international contacts and has already made his mark as President. On the military front, regional collaboration is increasing and improving, and the internal reorganization of the army has been carried out, although somewhat belatedly. The changes in the government structure, with a move away from over- centralization of power in the person of the President, will suit the style and political inclinations of the new President. Hence, the death of Machel has not brought South Africa the hoped-for result. As to a possible coalition with RENAMO, President Chissano has repeatedly rejected any negotiations with the rebel group, which is, in any case, now split into numerous factions. Indeed, the determination to prosecute the war has only been reinforced by such acts as the massacre at Homoine on 18 July 1987, when 388 people were left either dead or wounded following a RENAMO attack. The prospects for the country remain bleak in the short run, as it is only with the end of white rule in South Africa that the real conditions for peace can be created and Mozambique's development path properly resumed. Meanwhile, FRELIMO has proved its strength and stability by so far passing successfully through the ordeal of presidential succession and thus thwarting South African goals.
Veja o vídeo:
http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2012/08/gra%C3%A7a-machel-sobre-amorte-de-samora-machelvideo2.html

http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2012/07/gra%C3%A7a-machel-sobre-amorte-de-samora-machelvideo.html